Comments on the recent article “India’s middle class awakes” by Pavan Varma

Pavan Varma, an author and former diplomat, and currently an adviser to the Chief minister of Bihar, has recently written an OP-ED article in Times of India (23^rd November, 2013). Interestingly the article has made several points about the growth in importance of the middle classes in the Indian society and polity, which are almost the same or similar to those I made in my post “Rise of the middle India” (February 2013) appearing in this blog.

For instance, he notes, like us, the growing participation of the middle class in the massive public protests in the national capital on a number of issues, such as, miscarriage of justice (e.g. Jessica Lal murder case), corruption in public sphere (most notably during the Anna Hazare agitation), and more recently in a remarkable display of the public anger about the government’s insensitivity and callousness in respect of the Nirbhaya case which was symptomatic of a larger malaise. Clearly there has been a noticeable coalescence of public disaffectation with the way our democracy is being conducted. Varma, however, has not mentioned the three or four other factors (which we felt were equally important for the emergence of the middle class) like the stellar role of the news and the television media in communicating the true facts and vital details of the criminal and the corruption cases; government’s various acts of commission and omission and the people’s fights against this malfeasance through an effective use by the activists of the newly enacted RTI law; a proactive CAG (Comptroller and Auditor General of India) which is Government’s own audit watchdog and the law courts, and last but not the least, the emergence of the social media.

Varma has noted quite correctly that the middle class has gradually come to acquire even a numerical significance, a sort of ‘critical mass’, that it had earlier lacked and in some broad sense has also a India-wide homogeneity in tastes and aspirations. And as we suggested in our own post, the political parties today might find it no longer expedient to ignore this class. We also believe that it would be better to describe the confluence of various social groups and economic categories, as underlined in Varma’s article in terms of a range of earnings, as the middle ‘classes’ rather than an abstract conceptual category such as ‘middle class’.

The point of departure in Varma’s article is the weaknesses he finds within this emerging ‘political class’ and the lacuna it has displayed in its disparate protests and agitation movements and its apparent lack of political vision to provide an alternative to the objectives of and the ways and means adopted by the two main political formations, Congress- and BJP-centered coalition of political parties. He talks about their organizational weakness, lack of pan India presence as an organized force and leadership, apparent inability to go beyond pointing fingers at the multitude of scams and follies indulged by main political parties and not coming out with strong alternative policy options on a national scale. Presumably, Varma does not think much of the newly launched Aam Admi Party and its imminent political initiation by fire in the upcoming elections for the New Delhi assembly early December, 2013.

Varma fears that in absence of a well-articulated set of policy blue prints of national scope and significance, wider coverage of issues other than just a principled stand on corruption, the middle classes and their newer political representatives might not appear as effective to the electorate and fair badly in the elections. On the other hand unscrupulous political parties might use the anger of the middle classes about mis-governance or the governance deficit (lack of goods and services and the economic development the governments are expected to deliver) and manipulate their emotion to their advantage by subsuming and co-opting sections of the middle classes and winning them over to their partisan and disastrous self-centered and sometimes autocratic or fascistic policies.  

I think one can broadly agree with Varma’s reservations about the further and more important political role of the middle classes. It is true that while they (if you take the Aam Admi Party as representing them) now have waded into overt political action (like fighting elections) these representatives should probably avoid the simplistic reductionism entailing all economic, political, social issues facing the people of this country to the fountainhead of corruption. They must also make their position clear about the form of capitalist economic development model that the present ruling political parties are committed to and have a good support base among the elite and even sections of the middle classes. Many would argue that some of the major cases of corruption in high places arise out of the crony capitalism and because the kind of unregulated greed of a section of the impatient entrepreneurs is taken to be synonymous with the new aspirational ethos believed to be sweeping India during these past two decades. Since also much of India’s recent economic progress has come about after aligning the country gradually, probably inexorably, with the international trade policies (and quite a few dogmas), and relying on a sizable infusion of foreign capital and much of the domestic economic policies today have to be in consonance with the pulls and pushes generated at the behest of the big global power blocks (like US, European Union, etc) a clear-sighted foreign policy enunciation, that is neither subservient to these blocks nor totally isolationist like in the past, would be a prerequisite for a matured political formation that aspires to rule India. Coming months (or even years) will show if the middle classes have acquired that maturity.  



Anti-corruption – whose movement is it anyway ?

At the height of the anti-corruption movement during 2011, there were at least some commentators in the media who, apart from expressing serious doubts about the form of the movement and the remedy it suggested to curb corruption (in the form of an all-powerful, extra-governmental institution like Lokpal) also questioned the relevance of the movement to the toiling masses who form the majority of the electorate. The essence of the latter part of the argument was that while it was undeniable that the people at the lower economic rungs of the society pay a disproportionately large price for getting any service from the government machinery that was rightfully theirs, in their cruel daily grind to somehow survive (if necessary by paying a little bribe or speed money) they could not possibly accord a large priority to a high-minded protest agitation to eliminate corruption in the entire government machinery or the establishment, an impractical and utopian goal. A suggestion that the movement was elitist was probably implied.

The jury is still out as to the positive and definitive effect of the current mood of intolerance about corruption in the national capital, big cities and urban centers, among the educated, the intelligentsia, media and specifically that of the Anna Hazare led movement on the electoral outcomes in the assembly elections held since 2011. The results as always in the recent years had been dramatic in terms of biting the dust by the incumbent governments, but it might be disappointing to look for a clear indication of a countrywide uniform anti-corruption mood tilting the electoral choices. Although DMK’s decimation in Tamil Nadu may be ascribed to an extent to the culpability of A Raza (and others in the party) in the 2G scam having occupied both the national center stage and in the state adding to the general perception of DMK as a party full of corrupt politicians, it may not be fair to single out this cause for their fall, especially as governance wise DMK did reasonably well during their tenure. In Tamil Nadu emotive issues like the atrocities against the Sri Lankan Tamils and the perfection of the alliance arithmetic by Jayalalitha might have played equally or more important role. In Goa, a much smaller state, with a more focused political issue around a huge mining scam under the Digambar Kamat government, one might be more justified to flag the corruption as a major issue.

In UP and earlier in West Bengal the issue of regime change was probably the central one. Though the recognized left leadership in West Bengal may have been largely untouched by personal corruption it can not be anybody’s case that the left rule, especially during its last one or two stints had not spawned corrupt local satraps at the district and the block levels. The public anger at Lalgarh in demolishing the CPM’s party office and the opulent residence of the local party leader bore testimony to the popular disgust at their disproportionate wealth while the people they were supposed to serve were utterly impoverished. Still what was at stake in West Bengal in May 2011 was the possibility of ending a long-standing left rule in the state, ushering in what was euphemistically called ‘Poribartan’ (the change). Similarly, notwithstanding the latest indictment of several ministers in her government under corruption charges including Babu Singh Khuswaha earlier in the health mission scam, corruption in Mayawati led BSP government during its five year rule from 2007 was not the dominant issue in the 2012 UP assembly election nor the reason for her downfall.

Congress may be claiming that the spectacular downturn for the BJP in the recent Karnataka election is a vote against a corrupt government run in major part by Yeddyurappa whom the state Lokayukta indicted and the scams and loot, at the state’s connivance, by the mining lobby led by the Reddy brothers. But if corruption happened to be at the top of their mind the Karnataka electorate certainly could not have ignored the humongous record of financial scams and corruption notched by the Congress led UPA-2 government at the Center for the past four years. The election results do not seem to demonstrate such evenhandedness. Similarly, a little earlier, Virbhadra Singh who had to resign (or persuaded to do so by the Congress party) as a minister from the union cabinet under mounting corruption charges against him in his native Himachal Pradesh led, contrary to expectations in some quarters, the Congress party to victory in the state assembly election late last year and triumphantly became the chief minister yet again.

Thus the recent election results do not appear to provide any evidence of the heightened intolerance of the mass of Indian electorate (at least those who actively participate in the elections) about corruption as a priority issue. The commonplace and the cynical view is that for the broad electorate the caste or the religious identity (associated with the magnified assertion of a group’s self-worth, ‘asmita’ or pride), prospects of self-preservation (including physical safety in the face of hostile groups and communities, economic interests but not leaving out preservation of specific socio-cultural practices), and election-time monetary and other largess matter more. Chetan Bhagat in a recent OP-ED article in Times of India (18 May 2013) mentioned these issues as ones possibly overriding the concern of the Indian electorate regarding corruption.

Bhagat in his article suggested (without exploring it beyond it) an interesting angle to view this apparent disconnect between the progressive aspirations of the educated, enlightened, upwardly mobile middle classes and the stodgy and sheepish acquiescence of those occupying the lower depths to the corruption in high places. Ironically, according to him, this may be characterized as a sort of indirect revenge of the masses of the downtrodden on those miniscule sections of the Indian society who have always moved way ahead of them in terms of material prosperity. If anything the liberalization process underway over the last two decades has accentuated this inequity. Wages for the progress and the privileges cornered by these classes due to advantages of birth, education, rich inheritance, networking of classes or groups of higher economic and social standing, are being paid today to the less fortunate Indians for whom a morally spic and span society is possibly less of a priority than an equitable one. That is why they would elect a candidate promising them caste reservation in education and employment (hence making possible an improvement in their economic upliftment) or protection of minority religious rights (often an existential concern for many) despite allegations of financial corruption or criminal charges against him or her.

Ashis Nandy’s somewhat outlandish comments during a seminar within Jaipur literature festival earlier this year highlighted this same dichotomy. This school of thought shared by sections of the avant-garde Indian elite seems to believe that the increase in corruption indulged by the so-called ‘backward’ classes (SC/ST/dalit etc) is to be justified as a historical readjustment wherein the normatively ‘oppressed’ classes are finding ways to turn the tables on their erstwhile oppressors by learning and becoming more adept at the same game of corruption. It follows therefore, derived from this view point, that a principled opposition against corruption by the rich and powerful, especially those involved in the political governance of this country, is not only a distraction, but may eventually prove to be a stumbling block for the natural readjustment that the vigorous capitalism freshly unleashed by recent policies of liberalization. Dalit capitalism, according to these thinkers, is the way forward for ending the caste apartheid in India. And who does not know a little primitive accumulation of capital would serve this cause very well. One need not be squeamish about corruption if it helps this process.

Why secularism and freedom of expression have India specific connotation

The democratic experience in India is, comparatively speaking, shallow. We have been introduced to democracy rather late, around the middle of the last century, our political structure based on a borrowed template and formally modeled more or less on the British practice. India was not a democratic country before the colonial take over by the British or even during the major part of their rule, if one leaves out the last twenty odd years. During this latter period some rudimentary democratic institutions came into being as ad hoc response from the rulers to meet the increasing self-rule demand from the articulate educated Indians belonging to some strands of the nationalist movement. These were by no means expressions of mass democracy.

Anti-British movement led by Gandhi and others in Indian National Congress was primarily a political agitation by the Indian masses geared principally to remove the colonial yoke and aimed at major changes in the political superstructure characterizing the country (or the major parts of the country). To the participants of the freedom movement and the people at large the facile assumption was proffered by the leaders that the ‘freedom’ from the colonial rule will necessarily mean democracy, especially as it was being sought to be safeguarded by a meticulously worked document like the ‘Constitution’ (some very erudite, brilliant and humane Indians of the time having authored it). And with the first countrywide general election based on universal suffrage a significant measure of democratic practice was also demonstrated on the ground.

Despite many apparent failures and limitations of and attempts at subversion on our democracy it has to be ungrudgingly accepted, however, that this aspect of our democratic freedom – the ability of the Indians across the length and the breadth of the country to more or less freely exercise their electoral choices at periodic intervals – has remained sacrosanct for all these sixty five years. Being able to throw out of office through a largely non-violent election process the particularly hated dispensation of Emergency introduced by the Congress party during mid-1970s, or the unusually long (for about 34 years) self-perpetuating mis-governance by the left front in West Bengal that almost appeared as a fait accompli bear testimony to the strength of the functioning though flawed democracy in India. In view of what had happened in terms of the shrinkage of the democratic space in many countries in India’s neighborhood and elsewhere, countries that won freedom from the colonial rule around the same time as India this is rightly considered by many as a significant achievement.

Within this basic and broad democratic framework our polity through its varied and evolving strands (roughly represented by various political parties and groups) has managed to develop its programmes projected to benefit the majority of the people and organize corresponding actions so as to best serve the cause laid down by these programmes. The latter could be addressing planning and executing economic development projects, scientific management of the natural resources, managing country’s finances, creating and organizing infrastructure for health and education for the burgeoning population, engineering social upliftment and promoting social mobility, maintaining peace and harmony among a large and widely heterogeneous population characterized by diverse ethnicity, religion, caste, language, economic conditions, etc.

It is in this context that quite early in our experiment with democracy in the post-independence India (in about twenty years or so), the Congress party which by virtue of the momentum it carried from leading the freedom movement had taken over the governance of almost whole of India, lost the absolute monopoly in deciding the form, the content and the priorities of these programmes and who the beneficiaries of these would be. Partly because of conceptual inadequacy in understanding and mediating democratic reforms in a poor, underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural country with effectively feudal land relations and partly out of plain incompetence, arrogance of power, greed and corruption, the ruling party quickly lost the moral hegemony to lord over such a vast and diverse land. Soon there were other claimants to the mantle. First they came flaunting contrasting ideological worldviews. But gradually the challengers put up the flagstaff of diverse identities – of castes, religions, regional and tribal aspirations for ‘self-determination’ - appearing to shoot their arms and articulate newfound voices through the imposed veil of suzerainty of a central government with an overarching national ethos and perspective.

Since then it has become an open season for competition for occupying the preeminent place within the political space among all manner of opportunistic coalitions of groups openly and avowedly promoting their sectional interests and agendas that could sometimes appear almost irreconcilable to each other, quite apart from working against the demands of a modern nation in the 21^st century world. An important aspect of freedom interpreted within democratic India is thus an almost infinite tolerance of the articulation of a restricted, sectional identity even if that works at cross purposes with the interest of ‘others’ (beyond the given group or section) and the ‘nation’ as a whole, if that matters any more to the promoters of identity politics in India.

This incidentally seems to be consistent with the common interpretation of secularism as defined in our constitution. Within the scope of this interpretation, the Indian state (governments both at the center and in the states) can not just be neutral about all religions, they will have to actually bend over backwards to publicly support disparate agendas of followers of each religion, which effectively translates to supporting the religious organizations, parties and those ambitious elites leading them. Religion in India is not something of a cultural value system or worldview practiced by individual followers in private, without demonstrably occupying public space or grabbing public attention or demanding expenditure of public money (or the state’s indulgence or munificence in any way).

That is why shifting or demolishing (even under court order) temples or mosques whether these are of older or recent origins on busy public roads causing clear inconvenience to the flow of traffic in a modern Indian city can be an emotive and law and order issue. In the same vein the financial support by the government for the Haj pilgrimage is expected to be a time honored and therefore compulsory gesture that no decent government hoping not to antagonize a religious group can withdraw. Nor can the government afford to show itself to be fatally insensitive by proposing to control the noise levels in the residential areas and townships in modern cities and towns contributed by the quotidian calls to the faithful and blaring of religious sermons and functions over loudspeakers. And to speak of being wary of regimentation and proliferation of very archaic, ultraconservative ideas and mores among the co-believers in such congregations will be construed as sacrilegious.

That is why a literary work like fiction, essay or a poem or a work of art like painting, a cartoon or a film or play in contemporary India can and does routinely run afoul with the sensitivities of the one or the other among the myriad affiliates of religious allegiances. And the secular government respecting the fundamental rights (to preach and practice a religion) of the aggrieved, enshrined under constitution, is expected to assuage the hurt feelings (due to a perceived affront) by promptly stopping a painting exhibition, live performance or a theatre show, denying censorship certificate to a movie and banning the publication and sale of a book. In addition, most often by an unwritten convention, the state has to remain a passive spectator of the active vandalism and destruction of properties by the mortified activists exercising their freedom in dispensing vigilante justice on the perceived infringement of ‘their’ fundamental rights. Curiously, though, the minor matter about protecting the freedom of expression of the artists and writers and filmmakers under the same article of the constitution never arrests the attention of the government.  

It is true that religion happens to be a common enough trigger for backlash on the freedom of expression. However, freedom to preach and practice rabid regionalism, ethno-linguistic chauvinism, to promote caste-based reservation in jobs and promotion, to demand self-determination for a dwindling tribal identity are all very sacrosanct in India. And every Indian worth his salt should clearly know that his freedom to express any rational view on any of these matters is naturally secondary to the primary freedom of a host of other Indians of sensing a hurt in their identity and ideology.   

Interestingly, recent experiences also show that the way governments – both at the center and in the states – respond to an alleged infringement of freedom of belief (in a religion, a cultural practice, a certain ideology etc.) is highly variable. A leader of a political outfit can employ a language in his speech what, for all practical purposes, appears extremely abusive to an average Indian audience in describing or interpreting an action of a political opponent or a group, generally without inviting a rap from the law enforcing authorities.  In the cases of clear hate speech by some politicians against the believers of a rival religion the police have to be literally coaxed and pressured by the superior courts and mounting public opinion to even initiate some tardy actions. But when an anonymous netizen draws a cartoon of a politician and another shares the same over the cyberspace or a non-political challenger like Anna Hazare or Arvind Kejriwal (in the days before the Aam Aadmi Party was born) or Kiran Bedi lampoons a politician these would galvanize privilege motions in the parliament or immediate police actions by cyber-sleuths and arrests (preferably without bail) under tough provisions of the Information Technology Act. When a movie situates a budding terrorist in an in-your-face realistic cultural, religious and social setting, the filmmaker is hauled over coals for religious stereotyping of terrorism and movie theatres vandalized in whipped up public freenzy.     

Thus it is not always important as to what is being said, but rather who is saying that. Freedom is enshrined for a privileged section of the Indians to take offence on the slightest pretext and hurt others by word or action with impunity, but it will be jail for other lesser mortals in the country who dare emulate similar behavior or aspire for the same privileges.

Rise of the middle India

Though middle classes usually have been perceived by the political establishment to have only marginal importance based on its numerical sparseness vis-à-vis the electoral politics, the centerpiece of a mass democracy like India, they have always played a significant role in shaping the public opinion on a number of issues that affect Indian society, politics and economy.

Till recently, political parties, leaders and their apparatchicks, sympathasiers, apologists in the media generally believed that no matter how much vocal the educated, city-bred critics from among the middle classes appear to be, neither the party ruling the government nor the major opposition parties (harboring an intention to topple it and come to power after the next election) have anything to fear from these agitators because of their own strong ‘mass base’ which in the Indian political lexicon is sometimes pejoratively termed as the ‘vote bank’.

The twin advantages that the political parties had derived (and continue to do so) by sticking to their comfort zone are (a) the numerical preponderance of their support base and (b) the awareness about the lowest common denominator that binds and cements this base, namely, narrow sectional, sectarian, regional, religious interests in the context of winning the electoral battle (which, sadly, has become the be all and end all of the Indian democracy). Indian parties have by and large, over these last sixty five years since independence, found in the issues related to reservation of caste-based job and education quota (with further religion-based sub-quota being attempted recently) much more emotive appeal for the mass electorate they identify as their major constituency, and therefore put their weights behind such slogans and political actions, rather than enlightened measures for bringing corruption under control or to usher gender equality or dignity and justice for women. Also over the years the mainstream parties, often solely governed by populist tailism (not to forget the calculation of the eventual accrual of the electoral benefits) have unwittingly pandered to pressure groups fighting for the recognition of the various regional (even sub-regional or tribal) aspirations and ethnic identities. So much so that today there is a genuine fear of marginalisation of the so-called ‘national’ parties and their increasing irrelevance in major states and regions of this sub-continental nation.

However, over the last decade or so a wind of change has become slowly but surely emerging in various parts of the country, especially in major cities and towns which, somewhat awkwardly, may be described as an awakening of a liberal conscience of an under-performing democracy and it is the middle classes that are taking the lead. Broadly there were four notable developments that could be said to provide a backdrop to the new assertions to reclaim democracy in this country from being hostage to petty party politics.

The landmark public protests by large sections of concerned citizens in respect of the travesty of justice in the Jessica Lal murder case (and the Priyadarshini Mattoo rape and murder case in almost contemporaneous time frame) brought about a new non-political space where students, youth, women, senior citizens, activists, NGOs could publicly articulate their anguish and dismay at the apparent miscarriage of justice. Though limited in scope the successful outcome of these protests in creating enough public pressure to cause revisiting these cases at the higher courts and eventual sentencing of the accused suggested a template for the citizenry to articulate their justified grievances against the non-performance of the machinery of the state. More pertinently, the activists on the streets and their silent supporters in homes and offices saw that money, political connections, muscle power need not invariably tilt the scale of justice in favor of those who flaunt them and ordinary people could get justice from the judicial system which otherwise looked inefficient and ineffective.

Questioning the nature of Indian democracy

·        Is holding 5 yearly elections the hallmark of our democracy ? The manner in which such elections are conducted (use of money and muscle power, inducements, openly pandering to caste, religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional prejudices are known to vitiate the electoral atmosphere) raises serious doubt whether the election results are manipulated to an extent.

·        Though in principle people can make a free choice in these elections, it is really the political parties that one gets to choose from a list (though given as a list of candidates). The parties nominate candidates by a non-transparent process in which their winability at any cost becomes the major factor in their choice. Their present and future utility to the party takes precedence over the moral character, educational qualifications and background, knowledge, competence and wisdom that the candidates, ideally, could bring to bear on the delivery of public good to the constituents who would elect them.     

·        Assuming that the election provides Indians a means to choose and/or overthrow their rulers in a non-violent manner, they have to perforce agree to be governed for the next five years by a set of ‘chosen’ people, who despite pious protestations, effectively arrogate to themselves the power to set the rules of governance as per their convenience and their perpetual benefit and continuance, and insist that these ‘rules’ are sacrosanct, next to being god-given, and can not be challenged by anybody – people at large or by some other associations, organizations, institutions on their behalf.

·        Once chosen, through a far from satisfactory electoral process, a party or an alliance of parties parading a majority of number of wining candidates (MLAs or MPs) expects an effective immunity from critical scrutiny of the policies persued by the executive (the government) formed by them as well as the details of implementation of even those stated policies. Not only are the protests by the opposition parties as well as dissatisfied members of public and civil society considered undemocratic, but even adverse comments by a constitutionally mandated auditor of the accounts of the government are deemed to contribute to the perils of our democracy. In the same spirit some unfavourable pronouncements and judgments by the highest judicial institution of the country (the supreme court) are deemed hostile and not conducive to independent and efficient operation of the three sets of wheels propelling our democracy. Whoever has talked about the checks and balances being part of democratic functioning must be ignorant of the daily grind of a state machinery !  The question is : should we be proud of such a machine or a little disgusted and even scared at the prospects of having to deal with it on a daily basis ?