At the height of the anti-corruption movement during 2011, there were at least some commentators in the media who, apart from expressing serious doubts about the form of the movement and the remedy it suggested to curb corruption (in the form of an all-powerful, extra-governmental institution like Lokpal) also questioned the relevance of the movement to the toiling masses who form the majority of the electorate. The essence of the latter part of the argument was that while it was undeniable that the people at the lower economic rungs of the society pay a disproportionately large price for getting any service from the government machinery that was rightfully theirs, in their cruel daily grind to somehow survive (if necessary by paying a little bribe or speed money) they could not possibly accord a large priority to a high-minded protest agitation to eliminate corruption in the entire government machinery or the establishment, an impractical and utopian goal. A suggestion that the movement was elitist was probably implied.
The jury is still out as to the positive and definitive effect of the current mood of intolerance about corruption in the national capital, big cities and urban centers, among the educated, the intelligentsia, media and specifically that of the Anna Hazare led movement on the electoral outcomes in the assembly elections held since 2011. The results as always in the recent years had been dramatic in terms of biting the dust by the incumbent governments, but it might be disappointing to look for a clear indication of a countrywide uniform anti-corruption mood tilting the electoral choices. Although DMK’s decimation in Tamil Nadu may be ascribed to an extent to the culpability of A Raza (and others in the party) in the 2G scam having occupied both the national center stage and in the state adding to the general perception of DMK as a party full of corrupt politicians, it may not be fair to single out this cause for their fall, especially as governance wise DMK did reasonably well during their tenure. In Tamil Nadu emotive issues like the atrocities against the Sri Lankan Tamils and the perfection of the alliance arithmetic by Jayalalitha might have played equally or more important role. In Goa, a much smaller state, with a more focused political issue around a huge mining scam under the Digambar Kamat government, one might be more justified to flag the corruption as a major issue.
In UP and earlier in West Bengal the issue of regime change was probably the central one. Though the recognized left leadership in West Bengal may have been largely untouched by personal corruption it can not be anybody’s case that the left rule, especially during its last one or two stints had not spawned corrupt local satraps at the district and the block levels. The public anger at Lalgarh in demolishing the CPM’s party office and the opulent residence of the local party leader bore testimony to the popular disgust at their disproportionate wealth while the people they were supposed to serve were utterly impoverished. Still what was at stake in West Bengal in May 2011 was the possibility of ending a long-standing left rule in the state, ushering in what was euphemistically called ‘Poribartan’ (the change). Similarly, notwithstanding the latest indictment of several ministers in her government under corruption charges including Babu Singh Khuswaha earlier in the health mission scam, corruption in Mayawati led BSP government during its five year rule from 2007 was not the dominant issue in the 2012 UP assembly election nor the reason for her downfall.
Congress may be claiming that the spectacular downturn for the BJP in the recent Karnataka election is a vote against a corrupt government run in major part by Yeddyurappa whom the state Lokayukta indicted and the scams and loot, at the state’s connivance, by the mining lobby led by the Reddy brothers. But if corruption happened to be at the top of their mind the Karnataka electorate certainly could not have ignored the humongous record of financial scams and corruption notched by the Congress led UPA-2 government at the Center for the past four years. The election results do not seem to demonstrate such evenhandedness. Similarly, a little earlier, Virbhadra Singh who had to resign (or persuaded to do so by the Congress party) as a minister from the union cabinet under mounting corruption charges against him in his native Himachal Pradesh led, contrary to expectations in some quarters, the Congress party to victory in the state assembly election late last year and triumphantly became the chief minister yet again.
Thus the recent election results do not appear to provide any evidence of the heightened intolerance of the mass of Indian electorate (at least those who actively participate in the elections) about corruption as a priority issue. The commonplace and the cynical view is that for the broad electorate the caste or the religious identity (associated with the magnified assertion of a group’s self-worth, ‘asmita’ or pride), prospects of self-preservation (including physical safety in the face of hostile groups and communities, economic interests but not leaving out preservation of specific socio-cultural practices), and election-time monetary and other largess matter more. Chetan Bhagat in a recent OP-ED article in Times of India (18 May 2013) mentioned these issues as ones possibly overriding the concern of the Indian electorate regarding corruption.
Bhagat in his article suggested (without exploring it beyond it) an interesting angle to view this apparent disconnect between the progressive aspirations of the educated, enlightened, upwardly mobile middle classes and the stodgy and sheepish acquiescence of those occupying the lower depths to the corruption in high places. Ironically, according to him, this may be characterized as a sort of indirect revenge of the masses of the downtrodden on those miniscule sections of the Indian society who have always moved way ahead of them in terms of material prosperity. If anything the liberalization process underway over the last two decades has accentuated this inequity. Wages for the progress and the privileges cornered by these classes due to advantages of birth, education, rich inheritance, networking of classes or groups of higher economic and social standing, are being paid today to the less fortunate Indians for whom a morally spic and span society is possibly less of a priority than an equitable one. That is why they would elect a candidate promising them caste reservation in education and employment (hence making possible an improvement in their economic upliftment) or protection of minority religious rights (often an existential concern for many) despite allegations of financial corruption or criminal charges against him or her.
Ashis Nandy’s somewhat outlandish comments during a seminar within Jaipur literature festival earlier this year highlighted this same dichotomy. This school of thought shared by sections of the avant-garde Indian elite seems to believe that the increase in corruption indulged by the so-called ‘backward’ classes (SC/ST/dalit etc) is to be justified as a historical readjustment wherein the normatively ‘oppressed’ classes are finding ways to turn the tables on their erstwhile oppressors by learning and becoming more adept at the same game of corruption. It follows therefore, derived from this view point, that a principled opposition against corruption by the rich and powerful, especially those involved in the political governance of this country, is not only a distraction, but may eventually prove to be a stumbling block for the natural readjustment that the vigorous capitalism freshly unleashed by recent policies of liberalization. Dalit capitalism, according to these thinkers, is the way forward for ending the caste apartheid in India. And who does not know a little primitive accumulation of capital would serve this cause very well. One need not be squeamish about corruption if it helps this process.
