Demise of Soviet Union, sweep out of Left Front in West Bengal, India : some parallels ?

Found an interesting article in EPW trying a post-mortem analysis of the demise of Soviet Socialism in terms of a Marxian framework. The key point is that the soviet system, as it perpetuated itself over decades in a hostile international environment, gradually came to a saturation of the economic growth, stagnation, which worsened due to the arms race it was partly forced into due to the war and later soviet occupation in Afganistan. Within this worsening economic scenario, a segment of people, especially those wielding power in the government (the bureaucracy) and the communist party (central and regional leaders close to those running the government at various levels) have gradually come to acquire privileges that they found it legally and constitutionally perpetuate among their offsprings/relatives. Thus those saddled with the power and responsibility of the state – or at least a significant number of them – felt constricted in exercising their ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’ in bourgeois/capitalist individualist sense (creating and amassing wealth in their private capacity and by extension ‘legally’ controlling the means of production) by the existing legal, economic and political structure. Though whether and when these masses of privileged people formed a ‘class’ is not clear, the author argues that it is this nascent ‘class’ of people who were the real gravedigger of the soviet socialist structure with generous moral, material support from the west.

An important parallel arises in the context of the electoral whitewash (May 2011) of the long running (perhaps the longest running, democratically elected) left front (LF) government in the state of West Bengal, India. In both cases the rhetoric of the opponents of the regimes concerned are about the same : ‘communism’, ‘Marxism’, those professing these ideologies have thwarted the basic economic, political freedom of the populace. Beyond the demagoguery, one needs to identify the real issues, real actors in an evolving historical perspective. There may be a case for the thesis that the LF government, in the first decade of its rule, did devolve significant economic power to the rural poor, but the development of the agriculture, though among the better ones achieved by several Indian states, was not keeping pace with the rising aspirations among the rural masses who were, ironically, unshackled by the half-steps of land reforms initiated by the LF. Add to this the issue of failure to evolve an appropriate dynamic political structure that could feel the pulse and mobilize the dynamism of the rural masses in a direction that would have benefited the left’s cause (if there ever was any) in the long run rather than pushing them to become abject followers by threats and patronage. A rare insight was provided by one commentator in a TV discussion before the elections. He talked about the stagnation in the economic growth and opportunities, both in rural and urban areas. To partly circumvent this situation on both governmental and non-governmental initiatives there was some spread of informal economies (“informalisation of the economy”) in many part of the state. Fruits of these initiatives were distributed, controlled at the lower working levels by the party and the distribution was based on the carrot/stick principle (patronage for those who would support the party, threat for those who wouldn’t). It was argued that for years this was one of the mechanisms behind the manufacture of the consent that sustained the government this long.